Mandel Fogel filed suit against the Department of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, and the Chairman of Civilian/Military Review Board for veteran status for his service during World War II. Mr. Fogel served as a Pharmacist Mate at the United States Maritime Service Training Station, Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, New York. Now 84 years old, Mr. Fogel recently completed a law degree in preparation for this legal action. He is serving as his own attorney (pro se).
Photo of Mandel Fogel
MANDEL FOGEL
Plaintiff Pro Se
421 MERRICK ROAD
Oceanside, N.Y. 11572UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT: NEW YORK
[Hon. Arthur D. Spatt, U.S. District Court, 1024 Federal Plaza, Central Islip, NY 11722-4445]
MANDEL FOGEL, PRO SE, PlaintiffPLAINTIFF's FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT
-against--
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
SECRETARY AIR FORCE and
CHAIRMAN OF CIVILIAN/MILITARY REVIEW BOARD, DefendantsPLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY
Docket No.: CV 01-3269 (ADS)(MLO)
Plaintiff, MANDEL FOGEL, Pro-Se. ("FOGEL") complaining of the Defendants, and each of them, respectfully alleges and sets forth:JURISDICTION AND SUBJECT MATTER
1. This is an action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 USC §2201 et seq.
2. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment adjudication as to the validity of a defense, seeking judicial review of the decision of the Defendants and specifically the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force. and the Department of Defense Civilianl Military Service Review Board, referred to herein as "CIVILIAN/MILITARY SERVICE REVIEW BOARD.
3. The defense which is the subject matter of the requested declaratory judgment adjudication pertains to the action and/or decision of Defendant SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (hereinafter "AIR FORCE") and "CIVILIAN/MILITARY REVIEW BOARD" (hereinafter "BOARD"), copy of which is annexed hereto as EXHIBIT 1. Defendant BOARD. upon information and belief, is a political subdivision, bureau or other entity designated by the Secretary of the Air Force, as an integral part and parcel of the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, to determine whether or not to grant "Veteran" status to members of the U.S. MARITIME SERVICE ("USMS") who served the United States of America during World War II, as more fully detailed herein. Upon information and belief, Defendants have relied upon the defense specified in Exhibit 1 in response to Plaintiffs "Application For The Review of Discharge or Dismissal From The Armed Forces of the United States." Plaintiff seeks the relief set forth herein in his individual capacity premised upon his service to both the U.S. MERCHANT MARINE and his honorable discharge therefrom, and his service to the U.S.M.S. and honorable discharge therefrom.
4. Jurisdiction herein is principally predicated upon the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. in that this lawsuit and complaint solely seeks an adjudication of the validity of a defense, as aforesaid, and does not set forth any other cause of action.
5. Jurisdiction herein is, secondarily, predicated upon a federal question in that U.S. Constitutional criteria is enunciated in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and a U.S. District Court decision which similarly adjudicates the issue of AIR FORCE granting veteran status to a USMS member who served during World War II and was honorably discharged. Copies of these cases are annexed hereto as Exhibit 2. Subject matter jurisdiction thus exists upon this Constitutional violation implicating the due process clause and the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection, and the decisive subject that such decision making by a governmental agency or quasi governmental agency must be made pursuant to a statute, rule or regulation establishing specific criteria so as to obviate arbitrary and capricious decision making.
6. The SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM which is associated with Defendant, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, has previously issued an opinion by affidavit that Plaintffs service in U.S.M.S. and U.S. Merchant Marine "is tantamount to military service." A photocopy of the relevant portion of said "AFFIDAVIT-OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION" is annexed as EXHIBIT 3.
7. In addition to the above bases of federal court subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff will rely upon one or more federal statutes including but not limited to the statute which specifies the criteria which governs the decision as to "Veteran" status by Defendant BOARD, which is specified by the Defendants in EXHIBIT 1. A copy of the applicable statute is annexed hereto as EXHIBIT 4.
8. Jurisdiction herein is therefore further established by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 by reason of a federal question, which in addition to the foregoing Constitutional violation, and the statute set forth in EXHIBIT 4, includes but is not limited to other statutory bases in addition to those stated above. Among these additional statutory bases are 10 U.S.C. §1553, and 5 U.S.C. §701.
9. Jurisdiction herein is therefore further established by 28 U.S.C. § 1346, by reason of the United States being a defendant, which includes a suit against a federal official in his official capacity.
10. The subject matter of this complaint is the Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment adjudications as detailed herein for the purpose of declaring the determination of Defendant(s) in Exhibit 1 null and void, as applied to Plaintiffs application, and having this U.S. District Court, by a jury following a trial, or by summary judgment following an appropriate motion, determine that Plaintiff is entitled to the status of "Veteran" solely for the purpose of death and burial benefits, including but not limited to burial at a National Cemetery with a U.S. flag emblem affixed to his gravestone.
11. Plaintiff does not seek, by the declaratory judgment adjudications sought herein, either monetary damages nor economic advantage by monetary payments, which one entitled to "Veteran" status might otherwise be seeking.
12. By reason of the Defendant's arbitrary and capricious denial of "Veteran" status, as set forth in EXHIBIT 1, and Defendants' denial of Plaintiffs personal application for determination of "Veteran" status for the foregoing purpose, there is presently an "actual controversy" as that term is used in applicable statutes and court decisions.
13. In reliance upon the above statutory provisions, including EXHIBIT 4, and upon the Constitutional criteria enunciated in EXHIBIT 2, and upon the prior determination of the SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, and upon the basis of such other evidence as Plaintiff may develop during the course of this lawsuit, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court create a remedy for the grievous injustice, and unconstitutional decision making, demonstrated by EXHIBIT 1, and adjudicate the validity of the defense specified in EXHIBIT 1.
14. Plaintiff seeks a determination on constitutional violation by reason of Constitutional criteria (Exhibit 2) in implementing or interpreting the statutory guidelines of EXHIBIT 4, as applied to Plaintiff.
PARTIES
15. Plaintiff is an individual residing in the State of New York, within the geographical boundaries of this U.S. District Court, and a member of the U.S. MERCHANT MARINE ("USMM") and USMS who was honorably discharged from USMS and USMM after serving the United States of America during World War II in response to solicitations for such service to the U.S. military.
16. Defendant DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE is the principal governmental agency which oversees and is generally responsible for military procurement and national defense, both during WORLD WAR II and up to and including the present time comprised of the ARMY, NAVY, AIR FORCE, MARINES, and all subdivisions, bureaus, and quasi-military as well as civilians organizations serving the foregoing branches of the U.S. military. In the interests of brevity, this Defendant is hereinafter referred to as Defendant "DEPARTMENT."
17. Defendant, DEPARTMENT, Office of the Secretary, maintains its principal offices at 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1000.
18. Federal statute, 5 U.S.C. § 101, describes the said Defendant DEPARTMENT's function and duties as providing "the military forces necessary to deter war and protect the security of the United States through maintenance of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps..." Plaintiffs service as a member of USMS, and USMM as more fully detailed herein, was to the Navy during World War II and the decision as to plaintiffs "Veteran" status was encompassed by the responsibilities which DEPARTMENT allocated to AIR FORCE.
19. Defendant, Secretary of the Air Force (hereinafter "AIR FORCE"), upon information and belief, during WORLD WAR II, as well as Department of the Air Force, implemented the foregoing statutory purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 101 by establishing and overseeing the USMS and soliciting civilians such as this Plaintiff for service to the national defense. In this capacity, AIR FORCE during WORLD WAR II organized and trained USMS as well as its constituent members such as this Plaintiff for the preservation of peace, security and defense of the United States of America.
20. Such training by AIR FORCE, and/or other divisions of the Defendant DEPARTMENT, was for the purpose of support of the members of the AIR FORCE on active duty, as well as support of other branches of the U.S. military defined by 5 U.S.C. § 101, including but not limited to the U.S. NAVY whose functions are defined in 10 U.S.C. § 5011
21. Defendant BOARD was established by the aforesaid Defendants, and vested with statutory authority to determine whether "Veteran" status was to be accorded to a member of USMS by specific statutory criteria set forth in EXHIBIT 4.
22. Upon information and belief Defendants and each of them maintain an office in Washington, D.C. and in the State of New York.
23. Whether or not Defendants or either of them maintain an office in New York, venue is proper herein, since jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question and not diversity of citizenship, because Plaintiff resides in the County of Nassau within the geographical boundaries of this U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
DECISIVE FACTS WHICH ARE IRREFUTABLE
24. During the period of 1944 through 1945, plaintiff was a merchant seaman, as that term is used in applicable case law and statute annexed hereto as Exhibits 2 and 4, and enrolled in the U.S. Maritime Service ("USMS").
25. Plaintiff was also a member of the U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, and was honorably discharged from USMS as well as the U.S. MERCHANT MARINE as documented by evidence thereof annexed hereto as Exhibit 5.
26. For Plaintiffs service in USMS during World War II, providing support, assistance, and training to the U.S. Navy, he was awarded the World War II Victory Medal.
27. Heretofore Plaintiff made application for a determination that his service as a member of USMS and USMM during World World War II should be granted treatment equivalent to active military status.
28. That application was rejected in reliance upon AIR FORCE's Letter/Memorandum indicating the involvement of Defendant DEPARTMENT in the decision by the words:
"SUBJECT: Department of Defense.."and also makes reference to Defendant BOARD in the decision by the words:
"SUBJECT: Department of Defense Civilian/Military Service Review Board..." and also makes reference to Defendant AIR FORCE by the use of the letterhead "DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE."
A copy of the decision is annexed hereto as Exhibit 1.
29. The decision specifies, in the final paragraph of the first page of EXHIBIT I, that the statutory criteria for the decision is "Public Law 95-202."
30. It is a fact, established by documentary evidence annexed hereto as Exhibits 4 and 5, that Public Law 95-202 (EXHIBIT 5) with regard to the determination of "veteran" status by a civilian organization is found in 38 U.S. Code 106.
31. During the above period of my service to the war effort and national defense during World War II, I wore a uniform substantially identical in appearance to a member of the U.S. Navy.
32. During the aforesaid period of time, I had a rank of PHARMACIST's MATE, 2d Class, which is the same category as is used in the U.S. Navy, and I received pay equivalent to the U.S. Navy, and I was required to conform to U.S. Navy discipline rules and courtesies.
33. During the aforesaid period of time, the SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM made a determination that my service to USMS and the U.S. MERCHANT MARINE was "tantamount to military service" a copy of which is annexed hereto as EXHIBIT 3.
34. During the aforesaid period of time, the same WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION which is specified in the foregoing determination of SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM and the honorable discharges (EXHIBIT 5), determined that I was on active duty during the years 1944 and 1945 by issuing a document to me entitled "Release From Active Duty".
35. During the aforesaid period of 1944 and 1945, I was a member of the USMS, which was under the control of the U.S. Navy, and during this period of military service, I provided the following service to the U.S. NAVY:
(a) I was trained to shoot Navy rifles, so that I would be ready for any such combat if requested to do so.
(b) I served in the "Duty section" which involved service of more than 24 hours without sleep,and generally served for a duration of 36 hours without sleep.
(c) I responded to public advertising wherein Defendant DEPARTMENT was begging for the services of civilians to assist the military efforts of World War II,
(d) In 1944, I was enrolled in the U.S. Maritime Service Training Center, and was a member of "Ship's Company, which is a U.S. Navy expression and I was under the control, instruction and discipline of U.S. Navy officers for 11 months training as a merchant seaman, and attended to the medical needs of U.S. Navy personnel.
36. During this aforesaid period of time, the USMS was also, from time to time, under the control of the U.S. Coast Guard, and under the control of the U.S. Public Health Service.
37. During the aforesaid period of time, the U.S. MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY at Kings Point, New York was under the authority of the USMS, and was established during World War lI. Graduates of the U.S. MERCHANTS MARINE ACADEMY are given commissions in the reserves of the branches of the U.S. military and/or are transferred to active duty in the military for which they are trained by USMS. This is evidence of the close connection of the USMS to the armed forces of the United States.
38. It is a fact which can be established by documentary evidence, during the discovery phase of this lawsuit that:
(a) I was also a merchant seaman and was honorably discharged from the U.S.
MERCHANT MARINE;(b) the American Legion has determined that USMS personnel are "veterans" under applicable law and the Jewish War Veterans accepts honorably discharged members of the USMS as "veterans" for membership.
39. Plaintiff has exhausted each and all of his administrative remedies.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ADJUDICATIONS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF
40. BY REASON OF THE FOREGOING FACTS, AND EXHIBITS, Plaintiff asks that this Court determine the foregoing threshold questions, and to conclude by stating the following additional adjudications:
(a) that the facts set forth herein constitute a violation of U.S. Constitutional criteria, as applied to a merchant seaman, as Plaintiff was a member of and was honorably discharged from the U.S. MERCHANT MARINE.
(b) That the facts herein constitute a violation of U.S. Constitutional criteria, as applied to a member of USMS, as Plaintiff was a member of, and was honorably discharged from, USMS;
(c) upon the basis of the accurate facts and documentation by military agencies specified in the EXHIBITS annexed hereto, and upon proper application of governing precedent to those facts and documentation, that Plaintiff has, and had at all times relevant hereto, a protectable property interest, which this Court is asked to determine, ab initio, as any prior determination was flawed due to the deceit of defendant.
(d) Based upon criteria in federal statutes governing the definition of a "VETERAN" and statute(s) governing burial benefits of affixing a U.S. flag to the gravestone, this COURT following appropriate discovery and other preliminary proceedings, determine by trial by jury, or by summary judgment motion, or other appropriate procedure that Plaintiff is entitled to the status of "VETERAN" and the burial benefit, and that this COURT issue an Order directing Defendants accordingly. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this COURT accept subject matter jurisdiction, and issue the Declaratory Judgment adjudications requested herein, and for such other and further relief which this COURT deems just, proper and equitable.
Dated: Oceanside, NY
Respectfully Submitted,
July, 2001MANDEL FOGEL, Plaintiff Pro Se
421 Merrick Road
Oceanside NY 11572
Exhibit Excerpt
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
AFFIDAVIT- OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION (Special-Revised)War Shipping Administration, Training Organization
U.S. Maritime Service Training Station, Sheepshead Bay, Brooklyn, New YorkDescription of the Activities of this establishment
The U.S. Maritime Service trains men to serve with the U.S. Merchant Marine, sailing the vessels that are delivering needed munitions, food, and personnel to the armies of the United States and its Allies. On January 16, 1945, the War Manpower Commission designated the training program of the U.S. Maritime Service as a critical activity. The Director of Selective Service has stated that service in the U.S. Merchant Marine is tantamount to military service.Name of registrant Mandel Fogel Service Number 4514-02409
Selective Service Order No. 3332
Title of present job Pharmacist's Mate in Barracks Sick Bay and Medical Examination Unit
Average weekly rate of pay $51.08 Average hours worked per week 60
Prior work experience Mr. Fogel is a graduate registered pharmacist.... graduated from the Columbia University College of Pharmacy.... graduate study in pharmacy at the St. Johns University School of Pharmacy.
Exhibit Excerpt
Department of the Air Force
Office of the Assistant Secretary; January 5, 1982.
Memorandum for SAF [Secretary of the Air Force]
Subject: Department of Defense Civilian/Military Service Review Board Recommendation on the United States Maritime Service Training OrganizationUnder the provisions of DODD 1000.20, Determinations of Active Military Service and Discharge: Civilian or Contractual Personnel, the Department of Defense Civilian/Military Service Review Board recommends that the service of the members of the group known as the United States Maritime Service Training Organization not be considered active military service in the Armed Forces of the United States....
/s/ Robert D. Caudry, Brigadier General, USAF, Chairman, DOD Civilian/Military Service Review Board
Exhibit Excerpt
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Upon the recommendation of, and for the reasons stated by, the Department of Defense Civilian/Military Service Review Board, it is the determination of the Secretary of the Air Force that the service of the United States Maritime Service Training Organization not be considered active military service in the Armed Forces of the United States for purposes of all laws administered by the Veterans' Administration.
/s/ James W. Lucas
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Installations)
Jan. 23, 1982
Exhibit Excerpt
Ed Schumacher, et al, Plaintiffs v. Edward C. Aldridge, Jr. Secretary of the Air Force, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 862015LFO. United States District Court, District of Columbia. July 16, 1987.Merchant seamen brought action against Secretary of Air Force seeking judicial review of Secretary's decision denying them active military service recognition for purpose of benefits under Title IV of the G.I. Bill Improvement Act. The District Court, Oberdorfer, J., held that: (1) Secretary of Air Force abused its discretion in denying active military service recognition to American merchant seamen who participated in World War II military invasions for purpose of entitlement to benefits under G.I. Bill Improvement Act, and (2) decision of Secretary that merchant seamen who rendered services to armed forces while on ocean going service applied unstated and vague criteria and did not adequately support conclusion.
Summary judgment to plaintiffs.[Editorial Note: Ed Schumacher is deceased. Edward C. Aldridge, Jr. after leaving as Secretary of the Air Force was an officer in the Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, California, and is currently Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (October 2001). Aldridge is the one who decided after the 1987 trial that World War II ended August 15, 1945, while for all the other Armed Forces the end of World War II was December 31, 1946. Proclamation 2714 by President Harry S Truman declared December 31, 1946 as the end of hostilities for WW II. Title 38, US Code, Section 101 (8) states WW II as beginning on December 7, 1941 and ending on December 31, 1946. It took the U.S. Merchant Marine veterans 10 years (through 5 Congresses) to correct Aldridge's decision.]
Exhibit Excerpt
LAMBERT v. CALIFORNIA.
APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES COUNTY. No. 47. Argued April 3, 1957. Restored to the docket for reargument June 3, l957. Reargued October 16-17, l957. Decided December 16, 1957.
A Los Angeles municipal ordinance makes it an offense for a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable in California as a felony to remain in the City for more than five days without registering with the Chief of Police. On appeal from a conviction for failure to register, held: When applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge, this ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 226-230.
Reversed.
Exhibit Excerpt
GRAYNED v. CITY OF ROCKFORD
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS No. 70-5106. Argued January 19, 1972- Decided June 26, 1972
1. Antipicketing ordinance, virtually identical with one invalidated as violative of equal protection in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, ante, p. 92, is likewise invalid. P 107.
2. Antinoise ordinance prohibiting a person while on grounds adjacent to a building in which a school is in session from willfully making a noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of the school session is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The ordinance is not vague since, with fair warning, it prohibits only actual or imminent, and willful, interference with normal school activity, and is not a broad invitation to discriminatory enforcement. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536; Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, distinguished. The ordinance is not overbroad as unduly interfering with First Amendment rights since expressive activity is prohibited only if it "materially disrupts classwork." Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 513. Pp. 107-121.
46 Ill. 2d 492, 26.3 N. E. 2d 866, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Exhibit Excerpt
PUBLIC LAW 95-202 [H.R. 8701]; Nov. 23, 1977
GI BILL IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1977
For Legislative History of Act, see p. 3747An Act to amend title 38. United States Code, to increase the rates of vocational rehabilitation. Educational assistance and special training allowance paid to eligible veterans and persons, to make improvements in the educational assistance programs, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977". 38 USC 101 note.
38 § 106. Certain service deemed to be active service
(a)(1) Service as a member of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps for ninety days or more by any woman who before October 1, 1943, was honorably discharged for disability incurred or aggravated in line of duty which rendered her physically unfit to perform further service in the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps or the Women's Army Corps shall be considered active duty for the purposes of all laws administered by the Secretary.
Women's Air Forces Service Pilots
Pub.L. 95-202. Title IV, § 401. Nov. 23, 1977, Stat. 1449, as amended by Pub.L. 96-466, Title VIII, § 80I(m)(3). Oct. 17, 1980, 94 Stat. 22t7; Pub.L. 98-94, Title XII, § 1263(a), Sept. 24, 1983, 97 Stat. 703; Pub. L. 102-83, § 6(b), Aug. 6, 1991, 105 Stat. 407, provided that:
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the service of any person as a member of the Women's Air Forces Service Pilots (a group of Federal civilian employees attached to the United States Army Air Force during World War II), or the service of any person in any other similarly situated group the members of which rendered service to the Armed Forces of the United States in a capacity considered civilian employment or contractual service at the time such service was rendered, shall be considered active duty for the purposes of all laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs if the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe "(A) after a full review of the historical records and all other available evidence pertaining to the service of any such group, determines, on the basis of judicial and other appropriate precedent, that the service of such group constituted active military service, and
"(B) in the case of any such group with respect to which such Secretary has made an affirmative determination that the service of such group constituted active military service, issues to each member of such group a discharge from such service under honorable conditions where the nature and duration of the service of such member so warrants."(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the service of any person as a member of the Women's Air Forces Service Pilots (a group of Federal civilian employees attached to the United States Army Air Force during World War II), or the service of any person in any other similarly situated group the members of which rendered service to the Armed Forces of the United States in a capacity considered civilian employment or contractual service at the time such service was rendered, shall be considered active duty for the purposes of all laws administered by the Secretary of Veterans Affairs if the Secretary of Defense, pursuant to regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe- "(A) after a full review of the historical records and all other available evidence pertaining to the service of any such group, determines, on the basis of judicial and other appropriate precedent that the service of such group constituted active military service, and
"(B) in the case of any such group with respect to which such Secretary has made an affirmative determination that the service of such group constituted active military service, issues to each member of such group a discharge from such service under honorable conditions where the nature and duration of the service of such member so warrants. Discharges issued pursuant to the provisions of the first sentence of this paragraph shall designate as the date of discharge that date, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, on which such service by the person concerned was terminated.
"(2) In making a determination under clause (A) of paragraph (1) of this sub-section with respect to any group de-scribed in such paragraph, the Secretary of Defense may take into consideration the extent to which-
"(A) such group received military training and acquired a military capability or she service performed by such group was critical to the success of a military mission,
"(B) the members of such group were subject to military justice, discipline, and control,
"(C) the members of such group were permitted to resign,
"(D) the members of such group were susceptible to assignment for duty in a combat zone, and
"(E) the members of such group had reasonable expectations that their service would be considered to be active military service."
Exhibit: Certificate
Mandel Fogel To you who answered the call of your country and served in its Merchant Marine to bring about the total defeat of the enemy, I extend the heartfelt thanks of the Nation. You undertook a most severe task --- one which called for courage and fortitude. Because you demonstrated the resourcefulness and calm judgment necessary to carry out that task, we now look to you for leadership and example in further serving our country in peace.
/s/ Harry S Truman
The White House
January 19, 1948
Exhibit: Certificate
WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Certificate
Issued Pursuant to Public Law 87 - 78th CongressThis is to certify That Mandel Fogel has on this date completed a period of substantially continuous service in the Merchant Marine, commencing January 22, 1945, within the meaning of Public Law 87, 78th Congress (57 Stat. 162), and the Rules and Regulations issued pursuant thereto by the Administrator, War Shipping Administration. This certificate is issued for the purpose of establishing reemployment rights under said Public Law.
Attest:
A.J. Williams, secretary, War Shipping Administration
Dated Oct 31, 1945
No. 1986/s/ E.S. Land
Emory S. Land, Adminstrator, War Shipping Administration
Exhibit: Certificate (copy mostly illegible)
War Shipping Administration - Training Organization
UNITED STATES MARITIME SERVICE
Release from Active Duty
DecisionUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MANDEL FOGEL, PRO SE
Plaintiff,
JUDGMENT
-against -
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, SECRETARY AIR FORCE and CHAIRMAN OF CIVILIAN MILITARY REVIEW BOARD, Defendants.An order of Hon. Arthur D. Spatt, United States District Judge, having been filed on October 29, 2001, dismissing plaintiff's complaint as time-barred; and ordering that even if the complaint had been timely, the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force, dated January 23, 1982, which denied active military service status to the Maritime Service Training Organization would be affirmed on the ground that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise contrary to law; and directing that the Clerk of the Court close this case, it is
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff take nothing of defendant; and that the complaint is dismissed.